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Abstract
Even as deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved remarkable success on
vision-related tasks, their performance is brittle to transformations in the input.
Of particular interest are semantic transformations that model changes that have
a basis in the physical world, such as rotations, translations, changes in lighting
or camera pose. In this paper, we show how differentiable rendering can be uti-
lized to generate images that are informative, yet realistic, and which can be used
to analyze DNN performance and improve its robustness through data augmenta-
tion. Given a differentiable renderer and a DNN, we show how to use off-the-shelf
attacks from adversarial machine learning to generate semantic counterexamples
— images where semantic features are changed as to produce misclassifications
or misdetections. We validate our approach on DNNs for image classification and
object detection. For classification, we show that semantic counterexamples, when
used to augment the dataset, (i) improve generalization performance (ii) enhance
robustness to semantic transformations, and (iii) transfer between models. Addi-
tionally, in comparison to sampling-based semantic augmentation, our technique
generates more informative data in a sample efficient manner.
1 Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) models, such as deep neural networks (DNNs), have shown remarkable
success in several domains, including visual tasks such as image classification and object detection.
Thus, ML models have started being used in safety-critical applications such as in autonomous
driving and other cyber-physical systems (CPS). At the same time, it has been well documented that
DNN performance can be brittle to small perturbations of the input data [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Such
brittleness of ML models in safety-critical CPS can have disastrous consequences.
Semantic modifications to input images, capturing changes that have a basis in the physical world,
are particularly important in CPS. These modifications (c.f. Appendix H) include translations, rota-
tions, changes in lighting, contrast, or color, changes in camera pose, time of day, object deforma-
tions. They capture perturbations to the environment of the ML-based system that are semantically
meaningful, and more likely to occur in reality. Small semantic modifications to the input should
not negatively affect the output of the ML model; in other words, we want the ML model to pos-
sess semantic robustness. For example, for an object detector that must identify cars in an image
and draw bounding boxes around them, the output should remain unchanged to a change of car
colors. Inputs that violate semantic robustness are termed as semantic counterexamples. In spite
of the impressive depth and volume of work on adversarial ML applied to computer vision, most
of that literature focuses on pixel-level transformations to the input [3, 4, 5, 6, 8]. There is a need
for effective techniques for generating semantic counterexamples and for using them to improve the
semantic robustness of the ML model (DNN).
Preprint. Under review.
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Figure 1: Semantic counterexamples for object detection. Benign re-rendered VKITTI image (left), seman-
tic counterexample generated by our approach (right). The semantic changes involve changes in car positions,
orientations, and color. This causes the network to fail to detect the grey car in the immediate foreground.
In this paper, we address this need through an approach that leverages advances in adversarial ML
and differentiable rendering. We begin by defining a semantic feature space capturing features of
the environment that, together with a rendering process, determine the input image. In semantic
robustness, we are interested in exploring modifications to points in the semantic feature space that
produce incorrect outputs. Adversarial ML techniques currently provide an effective way to produce
such modifications in the pixel space for images. We show how advances in differentiable rendering
allow us to use off-the-shelf attacks from adversarial ML literature to generate semantic counterex-
amples in a sample-efficient fashion. For object detection, we show how our approach can produce
semantically-meaningful images that are misdetected (see example in Figure 1). For classification,
we show how dataset augmentation with semantic counterexamples results in (i) improved gener-
alization performance, and (ii) enhanced semantic robustness across adversarial attacks. We also
observe the transferability of semantic counterexamples between classification models.
We validate our approach on DNNs for both image classification and object detection. Our results
show that, in comparison to sampling-based semantic augmentation, our technique generates more
informative data given a query budget. Our empirical evaluation shows how our approach can be
implemented using three candidate attack algorithms (iterative FGSM [9], a variant of PGD [6], and
Carlini-Wagner [5]) and two differentiable rendering frameworks (3D-SDN [10] and Redner [11])
utilizing two popular synthetic datasets (VKITTI [12] and ShapeNet [13]) and analyzing two dif-
ferent object detectors (SqueezeDet [14] and YOLOv3 [15]) and two image classification networks
(ResNet-50 [16] and VGG-16 [17]). Our results suggest that, for image classification, semantic
counterexamples can induce upto 50 percentage point accuracy degradation whilst maintaining re-
alism (c.f. § 4.3). These counterexamples are highly informative (c.f. § 4.2), and can be used to
improve semantic robustness against those generated using different strategies (c.f. § 4.4).
Related Work. Our work builds upon the literature on differentiable rendering and adversarial ML,
which is reviewed in depth in Appendix A. In particular, we use Redner [18], a general-purpose
differentiable ray tracer for our image classification experiments, and 3D-SDN [10] for our object
detection experiments. The extensive prior work on Adversarial ML (e.g., [6, 4, 5, 8, 3]) focuses on
generating norm-bounded pixel-level changes to input images; however, these manipulations are not
usually realizable in the real world. Generating real world adversarial examples has resulted in sev-
eral efforts focused on particular semantic features, including physical world attacks [7], changing
color [19] and texture [20, 19], modifying the spatial orientation of images [1], and changing pixel
intensities [21]. Song et al. [22] utilize GANs to construct examples from scratch instead of taking
existing datapoints and perturbing them, and demonstrate some semantically meaningful changes.
Approaches that involve explicitly sampling the semantic parameter space are slow, imprecise, and
expensive [23, 24]. The most closely related work is by Xiao et al. [25] and Qiu et al. [26]; the for-
mer uses a differentiable renderer to induce changes in shapes and textures, while the latter induces
a different set of semantic changes using a generative model. Our approach stands out by being
general, in that it can apply to any semantic features as long as we can render from those features us-
ing a differentiable renderer. Further, we show how our generated semantic counterexamples can be
effectively used for data augmentation and that they transfer between DNNs (used for classification).
Roadmap. Our approach for generating semantic counterexamples is described in § 2 (due to space
constraints, some details are left to Appendix B). § 3 provides a metric for measuring the informa-
tiveness of generated examples. Implementation details and evaluation appear in § 4.
2 Semantic Counterexamples
The components of the problem considered in this paper are shown in Figure 2. We begin
by defining a semantic feature space Θ capturing the features of the environment that deter-
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mine the input image. An element of Θ is a vector of semantic features describing the envi-
ronment of the ML model, including the pose of objects, their color, texture, and other charac-
teristics, camera pose, lighting, time of day and weather conditions, background of the scene,
etc. Given a point θ ∈ Θ, a process R (modeling rendering, simulation, or camera capture)
produces an input image x. An ML model (such as a DNN) F then maps x to an output y.
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Figure 2: Our approach analyzes the composition of a differen-
tiable renderer R and an ML model F .
In this section, we define the notions
of semantic robustness and semantic
counterexamples in this context. We
then show how a combination of dif-
ferentiable rendering and off-the-shelf
adversarial-ML techniques can be used
to find semantic counterexamples. We
begin by defining some basic notation.
2.1 Notation
Consider a space Z of the formX×Y , whereX is the sample space and Y is the set of labels. Each
point x ∈ X is a concrete input vector, e.g., a pixel-level encoding of an image; we will assume
that X = Rn. Let H be a hypothesis space (e.g., weights of a DNN). We assume a loss function
` : H × Z 7→ R such that that given a hypothesis w ∈ H and a labeled data point (x, y) ∈ Z,
the loss is `w(x, y). The machine learning model is a function F from Rn to Y ; in this paper,
we focus on ML models that are DNNs performing object detection or object classification tasks.
Sometimes, to emphasize that the ML model depends on a hypothesis w ∈ H , we will denote it as
Fw (if w is clear from the context, we will simply write F , and use `F (x, y) in place of `w(x, y)).
When F is a classifier, the softmax output corresponding to F is denoted by s(F ) and is a function
s(F ) : X → ∆(Y ), where ∆(Y ) is the set of distributions over Y . Typically, F (x) is defined as
arg maxy∈Y s(F )(y). The notation for object detection is similar, and is described in Appendix G.1.
2.2 Semantic Robustness
The semantic robustness property captures the requirement that a small change in the semantic
feature space must only result in a small change in the output space. Given θ ∈ Θ, a renderer R and
an ML model F , we formulate it abstractly as follows:
∀θ′ ∈ Θ, ∀x, x′ ∈ X . [θ ≈Θ θ′ ∧R(θ) = x ∧R(θ′) = x′]⇒ [F (x) ≈ F (x′)]
where ≈Θ specifies that θ and θ′ are close in the semantic space, while ≈ specifies that the outputs
are close/unchanged as required by the application.
In practice, the relation ≈Θ is typically defined as having θ′ within an ε neighborhood of θ using
a suitable norm µ such as as l∞, l0, l1, or lp (p ≥ 2). Similarly ≈ is defined as either requiring
F (x) = F (x′) or having them within a specified neighborhood of each other.
2.3 Traditional Adversarial Examples
A common goal in adversarial ML is for an adversary A to take any input vector x ∈ Rn and
produce a minimally altered version denoted by A(x), that has the property of being misclassified
by a classifier F . Usually this is formulated as the following optimization problem:
minδ∈Rn µ(δ)
such that F (x+ δ) 6= F (x)
where µ is a norm on Rn, such as l∞, l0, l1, or lp (p ≥ 2). If δ is the solution of the optimization
problem given above, then the adversarial example A(x) = x+ δ.
Common examples of adversarial attacks in the literature include the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [4], projected gradient descent (PGD) [6], and the Carlini-Wagner method (CW) [5].
2.4 Semantic Counterexamples
Given a semantic feature vector θ ∈ Θ, a semantic counterexample θ˜ is an element of Θ in an ε
neighborhood of θ that violates the semantic robustness property. For example, if θ includes the
3
position of a car, its color, and the camera pose, θ˜ can be a small change to the camera pose that
causes F to misidentify the car.
Some differentiable renderers, such as Redner [11], directly generate an image x from a semantic
feature vector θ. However, others, such as 3D-SDN [10] first de-render an input image x to θ and
then re-render. In either case, the key aspects are that the perturbation is to be performed on θ and
the function R is differentiable.
Given this, we formulate the procedure of finding a semantic counterexample also as an optimization
problem, as follows:
minpi∈Θ ν(pi)
such that F (R(θ + pi)) 6= F (R(θ))
where ν is a norm on Θ. In other words, we want to find a small perturbation in the semantic
space Θ that will misclassify the sample. If the result of the optimization is pi∗, then the generated
semantic counterexample is θ˜ = θ + pi∗.1
Let A(F, x) be an attack algorithm to generate traditional adversarial examples (as defined in § 2.3).
We outline a general technique for transforming A to the semantic equivalent sA to generate se-
mantic adversarial examples (henceforth referred to as semantic counterexamples). The technique
works as by transforming algorithm A using the following rules:
1. Replace δ with pi.
2. Replace x+ δ with θ + pi.
3. Use chain rule to compute the gradients of terms, e.g., the loss function, that involve R(θ).
We detail some of the specific constructions we use in our experiments in Appendix B.
3 Augmentation Quality
Various strategies, such as random sampling in the semantic parameter space, can be utilized to
generate samples for augmentation. Suppose there is a dataset D and we have two examples for
augmentation (x, y) and (x′, y′). Which one is better for augmentation? In this section, we formalize
the notion of informativeness to address this question. Different variants of such metrics have been
extensively studied [27]. We highlight the intuition behind formalizing our metric in Appendix C.
3.1 Entropy & Information Worth
A common measurement that is used to measure the goodness of a classifier’s predictive capabili-
ties makes use of the concept of Shannon entropy [28, 29] which measures the unpredictability of
outcome from a given set. Let the label set Y have L labels {l1, · · · , lL}. Given set of datapoints
D = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xm, ym)} where yt ∈ Y is the true label of a point xt, a classifier F on the set
D divides the set into subsets D1, . . . , DL where Di contains points whose predicted label is li. Let
Ei be the entropy measured on each subset Di of size mi i.e., Ei = −
∑
j∈[L] p
i
j log p
i
j , where p
i
j is
the estimated probability of observing the class j in the subset Di.
If the entropy Ei for each subset Di is low, then the classifier divides D in a well-organized manner.
Thus, the following weighted average of Ei’s (henceforth referred to as information worth) is used
to estimated the quality of a classifier i.e., Eˆ =
∑
i∈[L] γi · Ei, where γi = |Di||D| = mim .
We also want to make use Eˆ as a measure of the quality of augmented data. As long as the datapoints
used for augmentation are realistic, it is better to have datapoints that do not agree with the current
classifier, as we expect the re-training to improve the classifier by fixing the incorrect classification.
However, the previous definition of Eˆ depends only on the predictions of the classifier. Thus, it is
hard to distinguish between augmenting samples generated using the methodology defined in § 2.4
from those generated using random sampling, for example.
1We note that the semantic parameter space is not homogeneous and it is unclear if one function can be used
to capture a suitable notion of distance. Not only should the norm measure the changes in the semantic space,
it should also approximate human perception. Additionally, in practice the “+” operator can be more complex
for semantic parameters such as weather or background.
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3.2 Incorporating Classifier Confidence & Realism
In the previous definition, each point x could belong to only 1 subset (i.e., binary membership).
However, with most DNN-based models, a point could belong to many classes (and consequently
subsets) depending on its softmax values (i.e., fractional membership). Thus, let µi(x) denote the
membership of a point to subset i. The most natural choice of µi(x) = s(F )(x)i which denotes the
softmax value of x for class i. We also assume that there exists a quantifiable measure of realism
ρ such that ρ(x) ∈ [0, 1] (larger value means the image is more realistic). In this work, since we
generate a new datapoint x′ from a reference datapoint x∗, we first define the similarity σ of x′ to x∗
as σ(x′;x∗) = 1− d(x′,x)dmax , where d is the LPIPS distance [30] and dmax is the maximum LPIPS score
achievable. This metric assigns ρ(x∗;x∗) = 1, because when there is no perturbation, i.e., x′ = x∗,
then d(x∗, x∗) = 0. Therefore, we define ρ(x) for x ∈ S as σ(x;x∗). Since ρ captures realism, if
the value ρ(x) is small for some data point x, we do not trust the classification result F (x). Based on
this intuition, we control the participation of each datapoint x in the information worth calculation
by weighting it by its realism ρ(x). These ideas are captured by using the following pij and γi in Eˆ.
pij =
∑m
t=1 ρ(xt)µi(xt)1[yt = j]∑
l∈[L]
∑m
t=1 ρ(xt)µi(xt)1[yt = l]
=
∑m
t=1 ρ(xt)µi(xt)1[yt = j]∑m
t=1 ρ(xt)µi(xt)
γi =
∑m
t=1 ρ(xt)µi(xt)∑
l∈[L]
∑m
t=1 ρ(xt)µi(xt)
4 Evaluation
Our evaluation is centered around answering the following questions:
1. Are the semantic counterexamples informative?
2. Are the semantic counterexamples realistic?
3. Can the semantic counterexamples be used in a sample-efficient manner to improve model ro-
bustness?
Our experiments were performed on two servers. The first has an NVIDIA Titan GP102 GPU, 8
CPU cores, and 15GB memory. The second has 264 GB memory, 8 NVIDIA’s GeForce RTX 2080
GPUs, and 48 CPU cores. Due to space constraints, we restrict our discussion to the experiments
involving image classification (using VGG-16 [31] as the target2). The experiments involving object
detection are detailed in Appendix G. We observe that:
1. Semantic counterexamples are shown to be both realistic and informative (c.f. § 4.2 and § 4.3)
using both quantitative and qualitative measures.
2. Classification models augmented using semantic counterexamples do not suffer from generaliza-
tion degradation, but show improved robustness (c.f. § 4.4) across all tested generation methods.
3. The semantic counterexamples we generate are sample-efficient and transferable across networks
– i.e., those generated using VGG-16 transfer to ResNet-50 (c.f. § 4.5).
4.1 Implementation
For our experiments, we utilize two differentiable graphics frameworks: (i) 3D-SDN proposed by
Yao et al. [10], and (ii) Redner proposed by Li et al. [18]. Using these frameworks, we augment two
popular synthetic datasets: (i) VKITTI [12]: scenes from photo-realistic proxy virtual worlds used
for multi-object tracking, and (ii) ShapeNet [13]: a large-scale repository of shapes represented by
3D CAD models of objects. The former dataset is used for object detection with SqueezeDet [14] as
the target, and the latter for image classification using VGG-16 [17] and ResNet-50 [16] as targets.
We generate semantic counterexamples by modifying elements from 3 popular methods – i-
FGSM [9] (iterative FGSM), a variant of PGD [6] (henceforth called GD), and CW [5] – to
generate their semantic counterparts (with the prefix s). Our implementation with 3D-SDN in-
volves 1000 lines of code; this involves making changes to the original code to enable end-to-
2Experiments with ResNet-50 follow a similar trend and are detailed in Appendix F
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end differentiation, and replacing several image manipulations with their differentiable counter-
parts. Our implementation with Redner [18] involves 618 lines of code. The code is available
at https://github.com/BerkeleyLearnVerify/rednercounterexamplegenerator3. The
overall pipeline is presented in Figure 3. We compare these semantic counterexamples with aug-
menting samples generated using (i) random sampling and (ii) Halton sampling [32] as baselines.
All semantic counterexamples generated involve modifying multiple semantic parameters (c.f. § E.2
in the Appendix). More details, such as the exact hyperparameters used for our generation process,
the semantic parameters modified, the dataset sizes, model parameters etc. are presented in Ap-
pendix E.
4.2 Informativeness
To understand if the semantic counterexamples generated are useful for data augmentation, we mea-
sure the accuracy degradation they induce on the VGG-16 model they were generated from. For
each baseline approach, we provide 2 ranges to sample rotation (the dominant semantic transforma-
tion, keeping the vertex translation parameter fixed). These are (i) the large range i.e., [-0.75, +0.75]
radians, and (ii) the small range i.e., [-0.3, +0.3] radians. Each cell in Table 1 contains per-class nor-
malized accuracy, and the weighted average is in the last column. Observe that semantic counterex-
amples generated using Halton sampling (in the large range) cause the most accuracy degradation
(the difference between the overall accuracy in the benign setting and the overall accuracy for this
particular approach). This is followed by semantic counterexamples (sCW and si-FGSM). Note that
the accuracy degradation is not uniform across all classes. For example, across all 3 methods we
use, the degradation for class 0 (airplane) is much lower than for class 3 (bus). The same experiment
is repeated with the ResNet-50 architecture [16] and reported in Appendix F, Table 14. The results
are slightly different, where si-FGSM induces the most accuracy degradation; this suggests that the
hyperparameter choices impact the efficacy of the method (i.e., si-FGSM is effective for ResNet-50
but sCW is effective for VGG-16).
Class
Strategy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 overall
benign 0.999 0.996 0.992 0.969 0.997 0.983 1 0.986 0.939 0.84 0.849 0.956 0.986
sCW 0.883 0.407 0.319 0 0.353 0.783 0.133 0.671 0.041 0.12 0.2 0.635 0.485
si-FGSM 0.836 0.642 0.460 0 0.402 0.783 0.40 0.507 0 0.240 0.273 0.619 0.529
sGD 0.917 0.707 0.589 0 0.589 0.883 0.467 0.767 0.041 0.160 0.232 0.781 0.657
Random (large) 0.876 0.612 0.462 0 0.436 0.933 0.2 0.712 0.143 0.36 0.576 0.819 0.582
Random (small) 0.969 0.935 0.789 0.040 0.810 0.966 0.466 0.904 0.346 0.52 0.535 0.936 0.830
Halton (large) 0.744 0.293 0.142 0.008 0.017 0.833 0 0.657 0 0 0.010 0.476 0.274
Halton (small) 0.979 0.935 0.832 0.165 0.690 0.967 0.667 0.945 0.245 0.32 0.131 0.721 0.757
Table 1: Accuracy degradation induced by different semantic counterexample-generation strategies. Observe
that semantic counterexamples are effective at inducing accuracy degradation (lower the overall value, the
better). All experiments are carried out using VGG-16 as the target model.
When the datasets are augmented using semantic counterexamples, the accuracy of the newly
learned models are presented in Table 2. The results suggest that semantic counterexamples are
useful augmentation samples as they do not harm generalization performance, as noted by the re-
sults in the benign column, but improve performance on unseen semantic counterexamples.
Information Worth: Using the formulation proposed in § 3.1, we measure the information worth
of all strategies highlighted in Table 1. The results are summarized in Table 3. Observe that halton
sampling using the large range generates the most informative points for augmentation. However,
as explained in Appendix E.5, such a strategy is highly sample inefficient. Each sample degrades
accuracy with low probability and 5× the number of sampling trials are needed to obtain an effective
counterexample. The next best candidates are obtained using strategies formulated in Appendix B
i.e., sCW and si-FGSM. Note that while the results in Table 1 may suggest that augmentation sam-
ples that cause the most accuracy degradation are preferred, they do not incorporate their realism
(c.f. Table 3). Table 16 in Appendix F.1 contains the results for ResNet-50, where si-FGSM gener-
ates the most informative samples (suggesting that the hyperparameter choices impact the accuracy
degradation vs. realism trade-off and, consequently, the information worth).
3We cannot open source the code using 3D-SDN as the license for the 3D-SDN code does not permit it.
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Test
Train benign si-FGSM sGD sCW
benign 0.986 0.529 0.657 0.485
si-FGSM 0.979 0.936 0.955 0.907
sGD 0.978 0.939 0.946 0.928
sCW 0.98 0.942 0.959 0.95
Table 2: Accuracy metrics of robust networks retrained with adversarial training using semantic counterex-
amples generated on the benign model. The rows indicate the method used to generate the retraining semantic
counterexamples and the columns indicate the dataset used for evaluation. Observe that retraining on semantic
counterexamples improves robustness across datasets, regardless of the initial train dataset (larger values are
better). All experiments are carried out on VGG-16.
Membership None Halton (large) Halton (small) Random (large) Random (small) sCW sGD si-FGSM
Binary 0.1082 1.1125 0.6165 0.8085 0.431 0.9565 0.7218 0.887
Fractional 0.1224 1.1158 0.5964 0.8604 0.4742 0.9464 0.7213 0.8783
Table 3: Information worth of augmentation samples generated using various strategies. Binary membership
uses the model prediction, i.e., µi(x) = 1[F (x) = i] and fractional membership uses the model confidence,
i.e., µi(x) = s(F )(x)i. Larger values are better. All experiments are carried out on VGG-16.
4.3 Realism
We use both qualitative and quantitative approaches to measure realism of the semantic counterex-
amples. The analysis was carried out using semantic counterexamples generated from VGG-16;
results from ResNet-50 are in Appendix F.
1. FID & LPIPS Distance: To obtain a quantitative measure of realism, we measure: (i) the Fréchet
Inception Distance (FID) [33], a metric known to correlate with human visual quality4, and (ii) the
LPIPS distance [30], another popular metric for perceptual similarity. In both cases, the lower the
better. The results are summarized in Table 4. We omit scores for Halton (small) and Random
(small) as they do not create informative samples. Each cell contains the average score (per class)
when the augmenting samples are compared with the samples they were generated from. The results
suggest that across both metrics, the semantic counterexamples are realistic.
Class
Method Strategy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
si-FGSM 5.62 20.56 23.88 13.40 8.56 16.25 21.14 11.05 18.30 16.91 18.68 8.04
sGD 4.33 18.73 22.97 10.99 6.20 14.19 25.53 9.33 17.17 16.79 15.39 7.45
FID sCW 6.23 26.48 29.74 11.18 8.39 15.85 31.97 11.75 21.65 17.08 15.93 7.79
Halton (large) 2.48 32.68 21.10 15.42 13.98 9.15 38.27 5.09 21.94 27.71 20.38 5.82
Random (large) 6.79 27.41 26.33 17.19 12.28 16.42 24.30 12.53 23.92 22.66 19.63 9.49
si-FGSM 0.25 0.53 0.40 0.60 0.45 0.43 0.36 0.41 0.44 0.33 0.47 0.37
sGD 0.22 0.52 0.37 0.58 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.38 0.46 0.34 0.45 0.35
LPIPS sCW 0.27 0.58 0.45 0.60 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.50 0.35 0.45 0.39
Halton (large) 0.12 0.59 0.37 0.66 0.55 0.26 0.51 0.22 0.51 0.46 0.47 0.28
Random (large) 0.29 0.58 0.44 0.67 0.51 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.41 0.53 0.41
Table 4: Realism measures for augmentation samples generated using VGG-16. Lower the scores, more
realistic the images.
2. Survey: To validate if (i) humans are able to correctly classify the objects in semantic coun-
terexamples, and (ii) if humans consider the semantic counterexamples realistic, we conducted out
an online survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk with 30 participants5. Each participant was asked
2 questions about 15 semantic counterexamples. The first question was to classify the object. The
second question was to rate the realism of the modification induced (in comparison to the original,
unmodified image placed next to it) on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). For the classification
task, we observe that the human participants are able to correctly classify the object 98% of the
time (on average). The average median realism for samples generated using Redner was 6.67 (mean
realism = 6.35). These results further validate the realism of semantic counterexamples.
4FID is primarily used to measure output quality of generative models and may not be ideal for our purposes.
5Each participant was a master worker and was compensated $8 for the study, approved by our IRB.
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4.4 Robustness
Results in Table 2 suggest that semantic counterexamples are useful for augmentation. To measure
if the retrained models are more robust, we test these models using methods formalized in § 2.4
(and Appendix B). Each row in Table 5 contains normalized accuracy by evaluating the augmented
model (as in Table 1) with test samples generated using the augmented model (as opposed to the
benign model as in Table 2); this difference is highlighted by the subscript robust. In comparison
to the benign model (in row 1), we can see that the augmented models are indeed more robust
to all adversarial methods tested, regardless of the technique used to generate training semantic
counterexamples. This hints at potential cross-method robustness transferability – i.e., training the
network to be robust against one semantic counterexample-generation method greatly helps with
robustness against other semantic counterexample-generation methods as well.
Test
Train benign si-FGSMrobust sGDrobust sCWrobust
benign 0.991 0.547 0.685 0.483
si-FGSM 0.978 0.797 0.871 0.819
sGD 0.978 0.836 0.910 0.797
sCW 0.991 0.884 0.918 0.879
Table 5: Accuracy metrics for benign and adversarially retrained networks on semantic counterexamples
generated by using various methods (in the columns) on individual networks trained to be robust to individual
methods (in the rows). Retraining against one method helps provide some robustness against all tested methods.
4.5 Cross-Model Transferability
From Table 6, we observe that the semantic counterexamples generated using VGG-16 as the base
model transfer to a ResNet-50 model trained on the benign dataset, though to a lesser degree (c.f.
to Table 1 for a comparison). This suggests that the ResNet-50 model could be retrained using se-
mantic counterexamples generated using a different model. This can potentially be used to reduce
the run-time efficiency of generating semantic counterexamples (as the cost of generating a seman-
tic counterexample is proportional to the depth of the victim network). We validate that semantic
counterexamples generated using ResNet-50 transfer over to VGG-16 in Appendix F.3.
Class
Strategy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 overall
sCW 0.998 0.713 0.621 0.858 0.451 0.916 1 0.917 0.102 0 0.030 0.085 0.588
si-FGSM 0.998 0.786 0.857 0.834 0.495 0.933 1 0.917 0.142 0.04 0.030 0.054 0.621
sGD 1 0.879 0.857 0.913 0.670 0.933 1 0.945 0.122 0 0.020 0.133 0.716
Table 6: Transferability of semantic counterexamples generated using VGG-16 to ResNet-50. This suggests
that images generated using VGG-16 transfer to a ResNet-50 architecture.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce the notion of semantic counterexamples, which are samples that are
natural transformations of a sample and which adversely affect an ML model. We demonstrate an
approach for generating semantic counterexamples that adapts and combines two key techniques:
algorithms from adversarial ML and differentiable rendering. We formulate a metric to verify the
informativeness of these counterexamples and further confirm that they help improve the robustness
of ML networks when added to the training set. Future directions include testing the operation of
these semantically robust ML networks within the control loop of a CPS, and making our algorithms
aware of the rest of the control loop.
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Appendix
A Related Work
Our work builds upon the literature on differentiable rendering and adversarial ML, which we review
below.
Differentiable Rendering: The process of finding 3D scene parameters (geometric, textural, light-
ing, etc.) given images is referred to as de-rendering or inverse graphics [34, 35, 36, 37]. Pipelines
for differentiable rendering (the opposite of inverse graphics) were proposed by Loper et al. [38]
and Kato et al. [39]. Kulkarni et al. [40] combine both de-rendering and rendering, and propose
a model that learns interpretable representations of images (similar to image semantics), and show
how these interpretations can be modified to produce changes in the input space. Li et al. [18]
design a general-purpose differentiable ray tracer; gradients can be computed with respect to arbi-
trary semantic parameters such as camera pose, scene geometry, materials, and lighting parameters.
Similarly, Yao et al. [10] propose a pipeline that, through de-rendering obtains various forms of
semantics, geometry, texture, and appearance, which can be rendered using a generative model. Our
experimental setup uses both of these differentiable renderers.
Adversarial ML: Adversarial examples are test-time inputs that result in incorrect outputs produced
by the ML model. Extensive prior work [6, 4, 5, 8, 3] focuses on generating norm-bounded pixel-
level changes to input features to induce incorrect actions. However, these manipulations are not
usually realizable in the real world. Our focus is on those attacks that result in semantically mean-
ingful adversarial samples. Generating real world adversarial examples has resulted in several efforts
(e.g., [2, 7, 19]), some of which are more realistic than others. Eykholt et al. [7] show how physical
changes can fool neural networks. Bhattad et al. [19] give techniques for colorizing or changing the
texture of images to generate adversarial examples. Geirhos et al. [20] discovered that certain models
are biased towards textural cues, while Engstrom et al. [1] observe that modifying the spatial orien-
tation of images results in misclassifications. Sharif et al. [21] create semantic attacks against facial
recognition systems by realizing changes in pixel intensities by placing brightly colored objects on
faces. Song et al. [22] develop an approach for creating semantic adversarial examples, but utilize
GANs to do this instead, using class-conditional searches on the latent space. This work, however,
constructs examples from scratch instead of taking existing datapoints and perturbing them, and
does not utilize gradient-based approaches, limiting the flexibility of their pipeline. Meanwhile, ap-
proaches that involve explicitly sampling the semantic parameter space are slow and expensive [23].
The work that is closest to ours is that of Xiao et al. [25] and Qiu et al. [26]; the former uses a
differentiable renderer to induce changes in shapes and textures, while the latter induces a different
set of semantic changes using a generative model. Our approach stands out by being general, in that
it can apply to any vector of semantic features as long as we can render from those features using
a differentiable renderer. Further, we show how our generated semantic counterexamples can be
effectively used for data augmentation and that they can transfer between DNNs.
B Constructions
1. Semantic iterative FGSM. Recall that z = (x, y) where x = R(θ) and y = F (x) = F (R(θ)).
Consider the loss function `F (x, y). Let θ0 be a starting semantic feature vector that we wish
to perturb into a semantic counterexample. The derivative with respect to θ, evaluated at θ0 is[
∂R
∂θ
]>∣∣∣
θ0
∇z`F (z)|z=(R(θ0),F (R(θ0))) (the notation
[
∂R
∂θ
]>∣∣∣
θ0
is the transposed Jacobian matrix of
R as a vector-valued function of θ, evaluated at θ0, and∇z`F (z)|z=(R(θ0),F (R(θ0))) is the derivative
evaluated at (R(θ0), F (R(θ0))).
The semantic version of FGSM (i.e., sFGSM) will, given the step-size hyperparameter α, produce
the following semantic counterexample θ˜:
θ˜ = θ0 + α sign
([
∂R
∂θ
]>∣∣∣
θ0
∇z`F (z)|z=(R(θ0),F (R(θ0)))
)
(1)
Note that we only assume that the rendering function R is differentiable.
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In a similar manner a semantic version of the iterative FGSM attack (si-FGSM) can be constructed.
Let θ0 be the initial semantic feature vector. The update steps correspond to the following equation:
θk+1 = θk + α sign
([
∂R
∂θ
]>∣∣∣
θk
∇z`F (z)|z=(R(θk),F (R(θk)))
)
(2)
Similar to Simonyan et al. [41], we define `F to be the the raw (unnormalized) class score of the
correct label instead of the normalized softmax probability for the attack listed above.
2. Semantic GD. We present a semantic version of the GD attack (sGD). Again, let θ0 be the initial
semantic feature vector. The update steps in semantic GD correspond to the following equation:
θk+1 = ΠBν(θ0,ε)
(
θk + α ·
([
∂R
∂θ
]>∣∣∣
θk
∇z`F (z)|z=(R(θk),F (R(θk)))
))
(3)
Similar to Simonyan et al. [41], we define `F to be the the raw (unnormalized) class score of the
correct label instead of the normalized softmax probability for the attack listed above.
Note that ΠBν(·,·) is the projection operator in the parameter space Θ. We also assume that the
projection operator will keep the parameters in the feasible set, which depends on the image (e.g.,
translation does not take the car off the road).
3. Semantic CW. The semantic Carlini-Wagner (sCW) attack solves the following optimization
problem.
min ‖pi‖p + c · f(θ + pi) (4)
where p = 1, c = 0.1 and the objective function f is defined as,
f(θ + pi) = max((max
i 6=t
Φi(R(θ + pi))− Φt(R(θ + pi))), 0) (5)
and Φi is the output corresponding to class i of the model F before the softmax layer. The gradients
are computed using the Adam optimizer [42], with the learning rate η.
C Notes On Augmentation Quality
C.1 Defining Information Worth
Based on the notation formalized in § 3.1, let Ei be the entropy measured on each subset Di of size
mi i.e., Ei = −
∑
j∈L p
i
j log p
i
j , where p
i
j is the estimated probability of observing the class j in the
subset Di.
pij =
∑mi
t=1 1[xt ∈ Di]1[yt = j]
mi
=
∑mi
t=1 1[f(xt) = i]1[yt = j]
mi
If the entropy Ei for each subset Di is low, then the classifier divides D in a "well-organized"
way, i.e., the subset is extremely likely to consist of datapoints of single label. Thus, the following
weighted average of Ei’s (henceforth referred to as information worth) is used to estimated the
quality of a classifier i.e., Eˆ =
∑
i∈[N ] αi ·Ei, where each weight αi is determined by the proportion
of the size of the subset Di to the size of the entire set D i.e., αi =
|Di|
|D| =
mi
m .
C.2 Salient Features of Information Worth
We make the following observations:
• A classifier achieving high accuracy is likely to achieve low value of Eˆ (however, the
converse is not true in general). Therefore, a high value Eˆ can be an indicator of a bad
classifier.
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• If we update a classifier (through training) from F to F ′, we can measure the quality of the
change in terms of the information gain which is the amount of decrease EˆF − EˆF ′ (larger,
the better).
D Pipelines
D.1 Overall Pipeline For Generating Semantic Counterexamples For Classification
Figure 3: Overall pipeline for generating semantic counterexamples for classification. The renderer (Redner) is
fed vertex, lighting, material, and pose information. The output model is then alpha-blended with a background
and the resulting image is classified a DNN (say VGG-16 [17]). The gradients of the output are computed with
respect to the semantic parameters (in yellow with green arrows). They can then be adversarially perturbed at
the points indicated by the arrows highlighted in green and the resulting image is re-rendered and re-classified.
We borrow the graphic for VGG-16 from [43].
D.2 Overall Pipeline For Generating Semantic Counterexamples For Detection
Figure 4: Our procedure for attacking an object detection framework: The input is de-rendered (step 1) to its
intermediary representation (IR) - semantic, graphic, and textural maps. Then, this is adversarially perturbed
(e.g., the red car is rotated) as described in § 2 (step 2). The resulting IR is then re-rendered to the generate the
counterexample (step 3).
E Implementation Specifics
E.1 Semantic Features
Recall that we generate semantic counterexamples by strategically perturbing semantic features.
In the case of VKITTI (using 3D-SDN), the semantic features include (i) color: the car’s texture
codes which change its color, (ii) weather: the weather and time of day, (iii) foliage: the surrounding
foliage and scenery, (iv) rotate: the car’s orientation, (v) translate: the car’s position in 2D, and (vi)
mesh: the 3D mesh which provides structure to the car.
In the case of ShapeNet (using Redner), the semantic features include: (i) pose: the camera angle
at which the object is viewed in the frame, (ii) vertex: the vertex coordinates of the object, and (iii)
lighting: the environment lighting of the scene
E.2 Semantic Parameter Combinations
Before we discuss specifics about the strategies we use to generate semantic counterexamples, we
need to understand how the semantic parameter space can be manipulated. In particular, we wish to
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answer the question: Which semantic parameters do we change? In the pixel perturbation setting,
all pixels are equal i.e., any pixel can be perturbed. Whether such uniformity naturally exists in the
semantic space is unclear. However, we have additional flexibility; for each rendering framework,
we can choose to modify any of the above listed semantic parameters independently without altering
the others, i.e., perform single parameter modifications. Alternatively, we can modify any subset of
the parameters in unison, i.e., perform multi-parameter modifications.
Case: 3D-SDN + SqueezeDet + VKITTI
Semantic counterexamples are generated using an iterative variant of FGSM (i.e., si-FGSM).
Parameters
Metric color weather foliage translate rotate mesh
recall 100 100 100 100 100 98.7
mAP 99.5 98.8 99.7 99.2 98.2 98.7
Table 7: Ineffectiveness of single parameter modifications. Performance of SqueezeDet on SAEs generated
using single parameter modifications. The model had (a) recall = 100, and (b) mAP = 99.4 on benign/non-
adversarial inputs.
For multi-parameter modifications, we consider the following combination of semantic parameters:
(a) combo 1 = translate + rotate, (b) combo 2 = translate + rotate + mesh, (c) combo 3 = translate
+ mesh, and (d) combo 4 = rotate + mesh. The results are reported in Table 8. We observe that
for combo 2, there is ∼ 35 PPs decrease in mAP. combo 2 will be used to generate semantic
counterexamples through the remainder of the paper.
Parameters
Metric Baseline combo 1 combo 2 combo 3 combo 4
recall 100 100 100 100 100
mAP 99.4 82 65.9 80.8 98.7
Table 8: Effectiveness of multi-parameter modifications for 3D-SDN.
Case: Redner + VGG-16 + ShapeNet
As in the previous case, single parameter modifications are not as effective as multi-parameter modi-
fications (refer Table 9 for normalized accuracy measurements). Additionally, modifications to pose
induce greater accuracy degradation than modifications to vertex. For all results reported in § 4, we
use semantic counterexamples obtained through multi-parameter modifications. Note that changing
the lighting parameter did not impact the accuracy of classification, and is consequently omitted
from all tabulations.
Parameters
Strategy vertex pose pose + vertex
sCW 0.892 0.543 0.485
si-FGSM 0.862 0.615 0.529
sGD 0.897 0.741 0.657
Table 9: Effectiveness of multi-parameter modifications for Redner.
E.3 Hyperparameters For Generating Semantic Counterexamples
In the context of generating semantic counterexamples, the value of the step-size parameter α is
proportional to the magnitude of the geometric and textural changes induced; the effect depends on
the semantic parameter under consideration. Large values of α result in unrealistic images rendered.
To avoid such issues and to simulate realistic transformations, we use a different step-size for each
semantic parameter. Similarly, the projection bound ε enables us to clip perturbations that exceed
this bound (refer to the construction of PGD [6] and sGD for its use).
15
1. Redner: Below, we report the hypeparameters we use for the various strategies formalized
in Appendix B. These are specific to generating semantic counterexamples using VGG-16 (refer
Table 10). For sCW, the attack was formulated according based on the work of Carlini et al. [5]
with the 2-norm used for our distance metric. The attack was untargeted, as we sought just to
induce a misclassification of some kind while minimizing the 2-norm of the distance between the
old semantic feature vector and the new one.
Strategy αvertex αpose # iterations εvertex εpose ηvertex ηpose
sCW - - 5 - - 0.01 0.30
si-FGSM 0.002 0.15 5 - - - -
sGD 0.01 0.20 5 0.05 1.0 - -
Table 10: Hyperaparameters used for generating semantic counterexamples using VGG-16. α is step-size, ε
is projection bound, η is the learning rate
These hyperparameters specified below are specific to generating semantic counterexamples using
ResNet-50 (refer Table 11).
Strategy αvertex αpose # iterations εvertex εpose ηvertex ηpose
sCW - - 5 - - 0.01 0.90
si-FGSM 0.01 0.45 5 - - - -
sGD 0.01 0.60 5 0.05 3.0 - -
Table 11: Hyperparameters used for generating semantic counterexamples using ResNet-50. α is step-size, ε
is projection bound, η is the learning rate
2. 3D-SDN: We utilize an iterative variant of FGSM to modify the semantic parameters (i.e., si-
FGSM). Recall that in FGSM, the degree of modification of the input is determined by the step-size
hyperparameter α ∈ [0, 1]. The hyperparameters are specified in Table 12.
Parameters
color weather foliage translate rotate mesh
α 0.05 0.25 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.025
Table 12: Hyperparameters for generating semantic counterexamples using SqueezeDet. α is the step-size.
We stress that for both differentiable graphics frameworks, these hyperparameters were obtained
after extensive visual inspection (by 3 viewers independently). An added benefit of our particular
choice of hyperparameters (for 3D-SDN) is that it enables us to use the same ground truth labels
throughout our experiments; the produced semantic counterexamples have bounding box coordi-
nates that enable us to use the same ground truth labels as their benign counterparts6.
E.4 Datasets
Table 13 contains salient features of the ShapeNet dataset we use for experiments with Redner. There
are a total of 3670 test images, 12843 train images, and 1835 validation images. Unless specified
otherwise, this proportion is used for all experiments. The class imbalance stems from the lack of
availability of samples for specific classes in ShapeNet. The experiments in § 4.4 use a smaller test
set of 232 images. that roughly maintains the proportions present in the full test dataset.
For experiments with VKITTI, our train dataset consisted of 6339 images, and the test dataset con-
sisted of 2082 images. Each image comprised of the following objects: (a) one or more cars, (b)
one or more buses, (c) no pedestrians. The object detection task involved detecting the car(s) and/or
bus(es).
6This fact is useful when we evaluate model robustness through retraining the models with semantic coun-
terexamples as inputs.
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Class Name # test samples # train samples # validation samples
0 airplane 775 2713 388
1 bench 464 1624 232
2 trashcan 119 417 60
3 bus 127 445 64
4 car 1549 5421 774
5 helmet 60 210 30
6 mailbox 15 53 8
7 motorcycle 73 258 37
8 skateboard 49 171 24
9 tower 25 87 12
10 train 99 344 49
11 boat 315 1100 157
Table 13: Salient features of the ShapeNet dataset.
E.5 Sampling Approaches
We utilize sampling based approaches as baselines only for the experiments involving image classi-
fication i.e., ShapeNet and VGG-16/ResNet-50 using Redner.
1. Random Sampling: For each benign point, we obtain 5 samples using Halton sampling in 2
distinct parameter ranges (only for pose transformations): (i) large i.e., [-0.75, +0.75] radians, and
(ii) small [-0.3, +0.3] radians. For each range, among the 5 samples generated, we first verify if the
sample induces a misclassification. If so, we pick the one with the highest softmax value for the
incorrect prediction.
2. Halton Sampling: We utilize Halton sampling as implemented by Dreossi et al. [24]; for each
benign point, we obtain 5 samples using Halton sampling in 2 distinct parameter ranges (only for
pose transformations): (i) large i.e., [-0.75, +0.75] radians, and (ii) small [-0.3, +0.3] radians. For
each range, among the 5 samples generated, we first verify if the sample induces a misclassification.
If so, we pick the one with the highest softmax value for the incorrect prediction.
Observe that such passive sampling approaches are sample inefficient. To obtain one counterex-
ample needed for augmentation, we are required to generate N = 5 samples and obtain their cor-
responding softmax values (by running inference on all samples). If one were to randomly pick a
sample generated by either sampling strategy, there is no guarantee that the point is informative and
can be used for augmentation. Active sampling strategies are more inefficient. In contrast, the mech-
anisms detailed in § 2.4 generate a semantic counterexample that is optimized to be informative.
E.6 Training Procedure
We detail the procedure we used for training to obtain both the benign and robust models.
1. Image Classification: A pretrained ImageNet [44] model is taken and the final fully connected
layer is retrained in both VGG-16 and ResNet-50, for 20 epochs, using the images in Table 13, to
obtain the benign models we use in § 4. To obtain the robust models, we replace half of the training
set (at random) with the corresponding semantic counterexamples, and retrain the benign model for
20 epochs.
2. Object Detection: The differentiable graphics framework induces several artifacts on rendering.
To this end, we first used identity transforms (i.e., passed the benign image through the differen-
tiable graphics framework without semantically modifying it) to obtain benign re-rendered images.
The entire pretrained SqueezeDet model is retrained for 24000 steps using all the 6339 re-rendered
images to obtain the benign model. To obtain the robust models, we replace a quarter of the training
set at random with semantic counterexamples, and retrain the benign model for 6000 steps.
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F ResNet-50 Experiments
F.1 Informativeness
We repeat the same experiments as in § 4.2. While the results broadly follow a similar trend, ob-
serve that semantic counterexamples are more informative in comparison to samples generated using
Halton sampling or random sampling (refer Table 14 and Table 16).
Class
Strategy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 overall
benign 1 1 1 1 0.998 1 1 1 1 1 0.989 0.984 0.997
si-FGSM 0.993 0.560 0.512 0.677 0.267 0.85 0.666 0.821 0 0 0 0.025 0.468
sCW 0.997 0.849 0.874 0.740 0.683 0.916 0.666 0.863 0 0 0.010 0.025 0.697
sGD 0.998 0.760 0.680 0.811 0.51 0.966 0.733 0.904 0.020 0 0 0.031 0.612
Random (large) 0.983 0.687 0.571 0.685 0.345 0.916 0.6 0.739 0 0.04 0.010 0.057 0.520
Random (small) 1 0.963 0.916 0.818 0.715 1 1 0.945 0.122 0.04 0.020 0.174 0.749
Halton (large) 0.984 0.553 0.226 0.629 0.052 0.933 0.466 0.863 0.081 0 0 0.212 0.383
Halton (small) 1 0.982 0.932 0.897 0.757 1 1 1 0.571 0.12 0.030 0.317 0.793
Table 14: Accuracy degradation induced by different augmentation strategies. Observe that semantic coun-
terexamples are effective at inducing accuracy degradation (lower the overall value, the better). All experiments
are carried out using ResNet-50 as the target model.
Test
Train benign si-FGSM sGD sCW
benign 0.986 0.469 0.612 0.698
si-FGSM 0.978 0.946 0.938 0.941
sGD 0.977 0.914 0.947 0.940
sCW 0.984 0.891 0.925 0.955
Table 15: Accuracy metrics of robust networks retrained with adversarial training using semantic counterex-
amples generated on the benign model. The rows indicate the attack method used to generate the retraining
semantic counterexamples and the columns indicate the attack dataset used for evaluation. Observe that re-
training on semantic counterexamples improves robustness across datasets, regardless of the initial train dataset
(larger values are better). All experiments are carried out on ResNet-50.
Membership None Halton (large) Halton (small) Random (large) Random (small) sCW sGD si-FGSM
Binary 0.108 0.979 0.518 0.968 0.604 0.656 0.236 0.978
Fractional 0.122 1.029 0.548 1.017 0.657 0.697 0.258 1.033
Table 16: Information worth of augmentation samples generated using various strategies. Larger values are
better. Binary membership uses the model prediction, i.e., µi(x) = 1[F (x) = i] and fractional membership
uses the model confidence, i.e., µi(x) = s(F )(x)i. Larger values are better. All experiments are carried out
on ResNet-50.
F.2 Realism
The results are reported in Table 17.
Class
Method Strategy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
si-FGSM 7.99 31.97 33.87 17.62 11.02 19.15 38.60 13.35 27.11 30.10 19.98 12.46
FID sGD 5.76 29.27 32.07 14.29 7.83 16.03 40.62 11.58 26.54 27.43 20.10 11.93
sCW 2.57 6.31 6.08 12.88 3.91 15.03 19.30 12.46 27.62 29.80 19.43 12.84
si-FGSM 0.31 0.60 0.50 0.70 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.56 0.51 0.56 0.46
LPIPS sGD 0.26 0.58 0.45 0.67 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.55 0.49 0.53 0.45
sCW 0.19 0.36 0.29 0.68 0.41 0.44 0.37 0.47 0.59 0.51 0.55 0.47
Table 17: Realism measures for augmentation samples generated using ResNet-50.
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F.3 Cross-Model Transferability
The results are reported in Table 18.
Class
Strategy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 overall
sCW 0.991 0.803 0.848 0.212 0.785 0.9 0.533 0.616 0.020 0.04 0.272 0.542 0.761
si-FGSM 0.878 0.521 0.521 0.078 0.362 0.916 0.2 0.685 0.040 0 0.252 0.562 0.509
sGD 0.943 0.618 0.495 0.252 0.635 0.983 0.066 0.822 0.082 0.04 0.353 0.619 0.667
Table 18: Transferability of semantic counterexamples generated using ResNet-50 to VGG-16. Lower the
overall value, the better.
F.4 Robustness
Test
Train benign si-FGSMrobust sGDrobust sCWrobust
benign 0.991 0.547 0.685 0.483
si-FGSM 0.978 0.5 0.331 0.698
sGD 0.978 0.771 0.569 0.862
sCW 0.991 0.733 0.586 0.711
Table 19: Accuracy metrics for benign and adversarially retrained networks on semantic counterexamples
generated by using various methods (in the columns) on individual networks trained to be robust to individual
methods (in the rows). Retraining against one method helps provide some robustness against all tested methods.
G 3D-SDN Experiments
G.1 Notation
Let x be an image which contains N recognition targets T = {t1, t2, ..., tN}. Each target tn,
n = 1, 2, · · · , N , is assigned a ground-truth class label yn ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L}, where L is the number
of classes. Denote by L = {l1, l2, ..., lL}. The detailed form of T varies among different tasks. In
image classification, T contains the whole image. For object detection, T is composed of all pixels.
Given a deep network for a specific task, we use F (x, tn) ∈ RL to denote the classification score
vector (before softmax normalization) on the n-th recognition target of x. The exact formulation of
the loss functions is dependent on the object detection network’s architecture. For example, the loss
functions used in SqueezeDet can be found in § 3.3 of Wu et al. [14].
G.2 Accuracy Degradation
We measure the degradation of mean average precision (mAP) and recall on the SqueezeDet object
detector [14, §3.3]. Note that SqueezeDet’s loss function comprises three terms corresponding to
(a) bounding box regression, (b) confidence score regression, and (c) classification loss. In our
experiment, we target the confidence score regression loss term to impact the mAP and recall of the
model. Results in Table 8 show the efficacy of our multi-parameter augmentation strategy.
G.3 Realism
1. FID and LPIPS scores: We observe that for the augmenting samples generated using 3D-SDN,
the average FID score is 0.102362. The corresponding average LPIPS distance is 0.523521. Observe
that the value of the FID score is much lower than those discussed in § 4.3.
2. Survey: We follow the same protocol (and use the same survey) as described in § 4.3. For those
samples generated using 3D-SDN, the average realism rating was 4.74 (average median = 4.26). In
the case of 3D-SDN, the lower scores can be attributed to the poor rendering quality of the differen-
tiable graphics framework; the perturbations made do not alter the geospatial positioning/orientation
of the objects in the scene.
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G.4 Robustness
When the benign model is retrained to be more robust, we notice that (i) its mAP improves by
7 percentage points (in comparison to Table 8) on semantic counterexamples, and (ii) on benign
inputs, the map is only 15 percentage points lesser than the baseline (of mAP=99.4).
Test
Metric Semantic Benign
recall 92.97 93.7
mAP 72.76 84.73
Table 20: Robustness improvements due to semantic adversarial training.
G.5 Transferability
To investigate transferability in the object detection task, we train a YOLOv3 network [15] on the
KITTI dataset and observe if the semantic counterexamples (generated using SqueezeDet) induce
performance degradation. On benign test inputs, the mAP of this network is 91.28%. When the
test set is populated with the SqueezeDet-generated semantic counterexamples, we observed a drop
in mAP to 87.50% (which is not as significant as in the case with SqueezeDet). This suggests that
semantic counterexamples (generated for detection) are most effective against the network they are
generated from. However, we are not categorically ruling out transferability for the 3D-SDN case
(our experiments did not involve testing a variety of hyperparameters as the semantic counterexam-
ple generation process using 3D-SDN is very time consuming).
H Sample Outputs
Figure 5: Semantic space adversarial examples. Benign re-rendered VKITTI image (left), adversarial ex-
amples generated by iterative sFGSM over a combination of semantic features (right). Cyan boxes indicate car
detected, purple indicated pedestrian, and yellow indicate cyclist. The adversarial example introduces small
changes in car positions and orientations, and noticeable changes in their color. This causes the network to
detect pedestrians where there are none (top) and to fail to detect a car in the immediate foreground (bottom).
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Figure 6: Benign images vs their adversarial counterparts generated by attacking the object’s pose and vertices
and feeding it back into redner. The benign images are on the top row, with the labels "car", "train", and "car",
respectively. The adversarial images are on the bottom and are misclassified as "boat", "car", and "helmet".
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